The protection method information exchange in the local radiocommunication system
(57) Abstract:The invention relates to radio communications, can be used to build communications systems with their artificially created interference, namely to build any local radio communication systems for the exchange of confidential information in the range of VHF, UHF and shorter radio waves. The protection method information exchange on the local system based on the decrease of the ratio signal/noise for receivers, the receiving of unauthorized access to transmitted information. For guaranteed protection for all kinds of situations provide a ratio signal/noise is less than one due to the fact that during operation of the radio system continuously radiate beyond the perimeter of the system and up noise signals having a capacity greater than the thickness of signals in a communication system, and which can cover the entire band of frequencies used in the system. 4 Il. The invention relates to radio communications, and in particular to build communications systems with their man-made radio interference, and can be used to build any local Radiocommunication systems designed There are a number of security information exchange from unauthorized access by third parties to transmit confidential information in communication systems for various purposes, in particular in radio systems. All of these methods can be divided into three main types: classification, time-frequency, building a communication system according to certain principles.When using a classification commonly used technique of scrambling, which is the simplest option for encryption. It lies in the fact that the structure of the information signal prior to being fed into the communication channel is converted according to the predetermined rules. After signal reception, it will undergo a reverse transformation, restoring the original information signal. As conversion is most often used summation with the mask signal is performed according to the rules of any arithmetic system. Typically, the mask signal is noise-like signal with a priori known principle of construction, and the summation is performed in digital form according to the rules of binary arithmetic. In this case, the direct and inverse transformations are the easiest and coincide. (Patents regulation, performed in analog form. (Application France N 2015737).Time-frequency method of protection is in program restructuring operating frequencies of the subscriber stations over time. The speed of this adjustment can be constant or variable (Technical report on theme "Involute", VNIIS, Voronezh: 1980).The method of the third type is that used separately or in various combinations of techniques such as:
- building a communication system in which communication channels have a minimum leakage energy;
- by lowering the capacity of the work of the signals in the system decreases the signal-to-noise ratio for receivers that attempt unauthorized access to the communication system;
- used communication channels with controlled configuration .Closest to the proposed method is a method of protecting information related to the third type and is usually denoted by the term "routing" .This method uses directional transmission of information via communication channels that allow for changes in the spatial configuration. The latter is chosen so that were used for transmission only safe cockamamie transmission routes, which are the same or close to the direction of the receiver outsider who attempt unauthorized access to confidential information. In the vicinity of points lying on these areas and therefore threatening the leakage of information, the latter should only occur on a route perpendicular to the direction of the receiver outsider. Particularly strict rule must be observed near the perimeter of the communication system. In this case, the leakage energy carrying information from the system is only possible due to the side lobes of the radiation patterns used directional antennas.This way of securing information exchange has a number of disadvantages, not being able to provide guaranteed protection from unauthorized access of unauthorized persons to the information transmitted in the communication system. Indeed, such protection can only be achieved at certain points of the perimeter of the radio system or on restricted areas of the perimeter. Therefore, protection is provided only in those cases when the receiver is performing unauthorized access, stationary and direction accurately known devices, managing informatiche unsuitable.If you have multiple unauthorized persons, protection is only possible when they use a very small number of receivers simultaneously performing unauthorized access. In addition, in this case, this method of protection is only suitable for certain types of agencies radio system (radial or regular users are located). In the most General case for an arbitrary placement of subscribers in the territory occupied by the communication system, such method does not protect information exchange.However, even in the absence of all the above drawbacks, prototype method cannot guarantee the security of information exchange from unauthorized access, because the presence of side and back lobes in the radiation patterns of the antennas does not completely eliminate the leakage energy carrier confidential information beyond the perimeter of the radio system. The sensitivity of modern receivers is such that this energy will surely be captured even at fairly large distances around the perimeter of the radio system.To address these shortcomings in the receivers that attempt unauthorized access to the communication system, with which This operation is performed for all points in space, surrounding the radio-communication system, which potentially can be receivers, performing unauthorized access. To do this, beyond the perimeter of the radio system up and during the whole time of operation of the system is continuously radiated noise signals in the entire frequency band used in the communication system. The power of these signals is selected greater than the power that the worker signals used in the communication system can have on the perimeter of the system.For the implementation of the proposed protection method information exchange local radio system must consist of two subsystems: the subsystem information exchange and subsystems create noise of the veil.In Fig.1 presents the necessary topological construction of such system; Fig. 2 - the location of the radiation patterns of the antennas, transmitters, creating noise veil, in the horizontal plane; Fig. 3 - the required type and location of the radiation patterns in the vertical plane; Fig. 4 - receiver of the subscriber station for the implementation of the proposed method.Radio system contains territory 1 occupied accepted abonnement 4 subsystems create noise veil 5 elements of a subsystem of information exchange related to different levels of the hierarchy, the channels 6 of the radio.Separate but interconnected elements 5 subsystem information exchange, placed in a certain area 3, together with 6 channels radio, connecting them form a hierarchical structure, in which each moment of time has the topology defined by the spatial distribution of subscribers served within the territory of the 1 occupied by them, as well as functional relationships individuals between themselves. Area 3 in practice, identical or slightly less than the area 1. Within the latter near its perimeter are elements 4 subsystems create noise veil that operate continuously during the entire time of the transmission of confidential information, protected from unauthorized access by third parties.5 elements of a subsystem of information exchange are subscriber stations, which are optionally connected to each other through the radio channels allocated for communication systems. Such compounds when their graphical representation to form the structure, which is part of the radio system structure, formed by the connecting lines, repeats the system of relations between the served subscribers.In the communication system both subsystems operate in parallel and from the point of view of the operations performed on them, quite independently from one another. The connection between them is that some of the energy of the noise of the veil in any real directional antennas, transmitters, creating noise veil, inevitably gets in the radio communication subsystem information exchange. Subscriber station last in the process are protected from noise exposure, using a priori and current information about building signals that are used to create curtains. But this connection of the two subsystems is parasitic and with the right build communication systems in General, it can be made very weak.This allows to consider the work of two subsystems separately. On the information exchange subsystem can say the following. Processes classes of channels of subscriber stations sharing of information between them are determined by the relevant standard algorithms currently used in radio systems departmental or General purpose. In audiosvyazi, in operation, and therefore does not require detailed consideration.The receiver of the subscriber station for the implementation of the proposed method contains the receiver 7 of the useful information signal, the auxiliary receiver 8 pseudonoise signal (PSS), the generator 9 pseudo-random sequence, the switch 10, the radio channel receiver 11, the adder 12 signals, the analyzer 13 the presence of PSS, the demodulator 14 and a low frequency channel receiver.The process of receiving useful information signal in such a receiver is determined by the kind of the used modulation and based completely coincides with the reception signal with the same modulation type in a conventional communication system.The only difference lies in the fact that the allocation of the useful signal from a mixture of signal and noise coming from the radio channel, the receiver of subscriber stations, the operation is removed from the input mixture of the noise components, which contribute to the radio transmitters which are elements of the subsystem create noise veil. This can be achieved by compensation, i.e., the summation of the signal received from the radio channel signal generated in the inner generatorname radio for the formation of the noise of the veil. As a result of this operation completely eliminates the influence of subsystems create noise veil on the quality of information exchange subsystem.For this to be implemented in practice, the signal emitted by the transmitter subsystem create a noise wall, should be a bearing vibrations with three FM. As of the 1st input signal should be used pseudo-random sequence, the initial moments which are determined by the clock used as the 2nd input signal. The third input signal carries information about the variations in the pseudo-random sequence generator, which will be performed during the formation of the next fragment of this sequence. The minimum length of such a fragment is equal to the time required to transmit the maximum possible amount of information about the variations in the pseudo-random sequence generator.Subscriber radio to work in the proposed system of radio communication shall, in addition to the receiver of the useful information signal, which is the main, contain auxiliary receiver noise-like signals. After the permanent synchronize its internal pseudo-random sequence generator, and the 3rd signal is used for each point in time to contribute to the work of this generator is necessary variations relative to the mode of its operation upon formation of the previous period of this sequence. From the output signal of this generator, as well as the 2nd and 3rd manipulating signals generated inverse structure of the signal noise of the veil, which is then summed with the signal taken from the air.As a result, after establishing initial synchronization of the pseudo-random sequence generator through time equal to the duration of a single fragment of this sequence, the receiver of the useful signal has the ability to completely exclude from the composition of its input signal samopodoben signal emitted by the generation subsystem noise of the veil. In the case when the auxiliary input of the receiver is missing pseudonoise signal, in order to avoid distortion of the useful signal internal shaper inverse patterns used champagnole signal is disconnected from the device, the noise compensation the main receiver of the subscriber station.The energy signals of the veil radiates a separate transmitter subsystem soony view of the directional diagram in which the vertical and horizontal planes shown in Fig. 3 and 2, respectively. At last, for simplicity, not shown in the rear and side lobes of the radiation patterns. Delete (N) of these transmitters (Fig. 2A, 3A) from the perimeter of the area occupied by the system (Fig. 2B), together with the width of the main lobe of the directional diagrams (Fig. 2B, 3b) of the antenna determines the maximum distance (M) between the individual transmitters along the perimeter in the range of VHF. It must be such that the perimeter of the radio system main lobes of the radiation patterns had no gaps between them. In this case, will create a continuous noise barrage and will receive the maximum quality of this veil.In the microwave frequency range and shorter-wavelength bands, which allow for a narrow-beam transmission of information, for fixed radio system, in principle, there is no need to create a continuous noise veil over the perimeter of the area occupied by the system. For these ranges, sufficient to cover the veil only point of intersection of the perimeter of the site with sequels communication channels and to radiate signals of the veil in the direction of these sequels for the perimeter of the site. If the communication is conducted with the moving objects, and in these diabase.Power noise signals should be such that the perimeter of the system they exceeded the power of signals from a transmitter subsystem information exchange throughout the operating frequency range of the latter. Purely practically, this means that the transmitter power noise of the veil must be greater than the transmission capacity of subscriber radios used serviceable subscribers.Individual elements create noise veils are completely independent from each other. The result of this code to the auxiliary input of any receiver in the subscriber station receives pseudonoise signals simultaneously from several transmitters, creating noise veil, it does not create any complications in the station, because this situation is completely analogous to the case of multipath reception noise-like signal. Relative to its known that it is resistant to multipath signal propagation, since the correlation reception delay of one pseudonoise signal relative to another more than one binary symbol, leads to the fact that the delayed signal is perceived as uncorrelated interference to the reception. Therefore, the delayed signal just Abrasiv the R, in: Dixon, R. K. Broadband systems: Lane. from English. /Ed. by C. I. Zhuravleva. - M.: Communication, 1679, S. 304. The probability of delay when delayed signal affects the reception of another broadband signal is very small. Therefore, the influence of the signal emitted from one transmitter noise of the veil for the reception of subscriber radio signal from another transmitter of the veil can almost be ignored.As a result of such building radio system subsystem information exchange under cover of the noise of the veil can successfully perform its functions. There is no possibility of unauthorized unauthorized access to confidential information exchanged between the subscribers of a radio communication system, since the signal noise of the veil hides the signals subsystem information exchange due to the energy exceeding these signals, the signals of the veil in the entire frequency range of the radio system and due to the large complexity of the build signal of the veil. The protection method information exchange in the local system of radio communication, based on the decrease of the ratio signal/noise for receivers that attempt unauthorized access to transmitted AI up noise signals, having a capacity greater power working signals in a communication system, which can cover the entire band of frequencies used in the system.
FIELD: technologies for preventing interception of data.
SUBSTANCE: transferred signal is concealed via adding noises to communication line in speech frequency range with linear addition of speech data signal with noise signal of higher level. Concealment is removed via adaptive filtration of received signal with compensation of noise component and separation of data component. Addition of noises to communication line is performed from the side of sensor. Noise signal during addition of noises and adaptive filtration is formed of a sum of counts of several noise series with nonevent sizes via their random querying. At the beginning of each communication session a signal is sent to side of receiver, characterizing order of querying of series, and starting signal, providing for synchronism of noises addition and filtering processes. All operations are performed by means of microprocessors, mounted on both sides of communication line, dependently of loaded software providing for change of direction of transmission and protection of speech data signal. Invention allows to simplify protection while providing for absolute confidentiality of transmitted data.
EFFECT: higher reliability.
6 cl, 4 dwg
FIELD: radio engineering; secret intelligence protected radio communication systems.
SUBSTANCE: proposed radio communication system incorporating provision for suppressing enemy's radio communication means and radio control channels has information subsystem, noise jamming subsystem, noise memory subsystem, information subsystem elements, and subsystem elements interface unit; each element of information subsystem is made in the form of multichannel time-division radio station; each element of noise jamming subsystem is made in the form of time division multichannel radio station, and each of noise jamming subsystem elements is made in the form of barrage jamming transmitter built around noise signal generating driver; used as drivers are self-stochastic generator operating in different frequency bands.
EFFECT: enhanced intelligence protection of communication channels, simplified design, enhanced reliability.
2 cl, 13 dwg
FIELD: methods for protection of an active radar against antiradar missiles.
SUBSTANCE: in the method and device for protection of radar against antiradar missiles accomplished are radiation of sounding signals, detection of antiradar missiles, guidance of anti-aircraft missiles on the antiradar missile, destruction of the anti-radar missile by blasting of the warhead of the anti-aircraft missile, guidance of the anti-aircraft missile at least during a time period directly preceding the blasting of the warhead of the anti-aircraft missile, all this is conducted on the trajectory passing in the vicinity of the imaginary line connecting the antiradar missile and the radar, in this case constantly are determined the distance from the radar to the antiradar missile Dr-arm, from the radar to the anti-aircraft missile Dr-aacm and from the anti-aircraft missile to the antiradar missile Daacm-acm, and at the time moments leading the moments of radiation of the radar sounding signal by value t=(Dr-aacm+Daacm-arm-Dr-arm)/v, where v - velocity of light, commands are given from the radar to the anti-aircraft missile for radiation of a signal simulating the radar signal.
EFFECT: reduced dynamic errors of guidance of anti-aircraft missile on antiradar missile.
3 cl, 6 dwg
FIELD: espionage protection techniques.
SUBSTANCE: method includes serial scanning of target surface by nonlinear locator, recording and processing received response in PC with displaying of positions of semiconductor devices. In case of appearance of response on target surface on command from PC visible laser is enabled, response points are lighted by it, pictured using digital camera and recorded in PC. Responses are process in conjunction with target surface image and integral picture of responses is built. On basis of received picture additionally visually detected are potentially possible places for placing semiconductor devices, and also trajectories of tracing of communications on target surface, structures of inbuilt metal construction and anomalies in said structures.
EFFECT: higher precision, higher efficiency, broader functional capabilities.
FIELD: radio communications.
SUBSTANCE: system has transmitting portion, which contains clock pulse generator 1, first and second D-code generators 21-22, first and second generator of double frequency manipulation 31-32, adder 4, modulator 5, frequencies synthesizer 6, pseudo-random numbers generator 7. said portion is connected through broadcast line 8 to receiving portion, which has demodulator 9, frequencies synthesizer 10, pseudo-random numbers 11, signals selector 12, clock pulses generator 13, block for selecting additional series 14, block for folding additional series 15, solving block 16. new set of significant features provides for possible implementation of distributed receipt with code structure of specific orthogonal quadruple-encoded series without expansion of available frequency resource.
EFFECT: broader functional capabilities, higher trustworthiness, higher efficiency, higher interference resistance.
2 cl, 5 dwg
FIELD: radio engineering, possible radio-technical reconnaissance of radio-electronic means of enemy.
SUBSTANCE: radio-technical reconnaissance station contains antenna device 1, receiver 2, bearing device 3, analyzer 4 of received signal parameters, device 5 for memorizing and processing received information, telemetric device 6, receiving antennae 7-9, block 10 for readjustment, first 11 and second 23 heterodynes, mixers 12-14 and 24, amplifiers 17-19 of first intermediate frequency, detector 20, first 21 and second 31 delay lines, key 22, amplifier 25 of second amplification frequency, multipliers 26,27 and 30, narrowband filters 28,29 and 32, phase detector 33, phase meters 34 and 35, engine 15 and supporting generator 16.
EFFECT: expanded area of reconnaissance and increased number of detected radio-electronic means due to positioning of radio-technical reconnaissance station onboard the helicopter.
FIELD: technology for generating artificial interference for concealing electromagnetic channels leaking speech information.
SUBSTANCE: in accordance to invention, method includes generation, amplification and emission of concealing noise signal, and also substantial changes and additions, namely: noise signal is amplified in mode B or AB, pulse automatic-compensating stabilization of power amplifier powering voltage is utilized, stabilized voltage is filtered by upper frequencies filter, lower limiting frequency is higher than upper frequency of audible spectrum, but lower than frequency of pulse stabilizer.
EFFECT: increased efficiency of method while power for concealed equipment is delivered by industrial alternating-current network.
FIELD: radio engineering, namely, equipment for generating artificial interference, possible use for protecting information from leaking along vibro-acoustic channel from a room.
SUBSTANCE: in accordance to method for protecting speech information along vibro-acoustic channel, interference is generated for masking speech signal, while interference is formed as M-series of pulses with following transformation, while transformation of M-series of pulses is performed in form of generation of vibration impact signals, by which speech signal is multiplicatively masked, while M-series of pulses is generated from period to period in accordance to random rule.
EFFECT: increased efficiency of technical means for information protection, decreased acoustic radiations, interfering with negotiations, radiations, affecting operation of nearby radio-electronic means, and also disclosing a structure of noise interference, decreasing probability of it being filtered.
FIELD: engineering of equipment for counteracting commercial and industrial espionage.
SUBSTANCE: device includes auxiliary transmitting-receiving antenna, antenna commutator, controllable interference generator, radio radiation detector and additional generator of interference with individual antenna. Launch circuit of controllable interference generator is connected to of radio radiation detector. The latter is made with possible recording of beginning of emission of radio interface of cell phone during its communication with external device, determining presence and frequency channel of unsanctioned communication with radio interface and adjustment of frequency of controlled interference generator. Commutator is enabled with possible switching of auxiliary antenna from input of radio emission detector to output of controllable interference generator for suppressing unsanctioned data transfer through radio interface. Output of radio radiation detector is connected to controlling inputs of commutator and controlled interference generator. For additional interference generator, mode of permanent generation of interference is set in radio spectrum of global positioning systems, excluding capability for determining coordinates of cell phone.
EFFECT: increased efficiency of cell protection from unsanctioned pickup of information from radio interface with reliable suppression of attempts of determining current location of cell phone.
3 cl, 1 dwg
FIELD: technology for creating artificial interference for masking speech information in industrial network of alternating current.
SUBSTANCE: device (dwg. 1) contains rectifier 2 and, connected serially, noise signal generator 4, noise signal power amplifier 5 and emitter 6, in noise signal amplifier 5, mode B or AB is implemented, between rectifier 2 and power chain of noise signal generator 4 and power amplifier of noise signal, impulse automatic-compensation voltage stabilizer 8 is inserted, at output of which upper frequency filter is mounted, lower cut frequency of which is higher than upper frequency of audible spectrum, but lower than clock frequency of impulse automatic-compensation voltage stabilizer 8.
EFFECT: increased protection of sound amplification equipment from possible electromagnetic leakage of sound information along power chains.