Device for protection from piracy and falsification of integrated circuits

FIELD: physics.

SUBSTANCE: invention relates to semiconductor microelectronic devices and specifically to devices for protection from piracy and falsification of integrated circuits (IC), which are embedded in an IC chip. The device for protection from piracy and falsification of integrated circuits comprises, embedded in the chip of an authentic integrated circuit, a first logic register with elements for inputting an identification number (label) by a trusted integrated circuit manufacturer through working or auxiliary leads of the integrated circuit and which block subsequent input of another identification number. The device further includes a second logic register with elements for inputting, by the user of the integrated circuit, an identification number known to said user and a logic coincidence circuit with elements for outputting information on authenticity and permission for normal operation, in which the identification number stored in the first logic register of the integrated circuit is compared with the identification number in the second logic register, and if the identification numbers match, normal operation of the integrated circuit is allowed.

EFFECT: authentication of an integrated circuit, preventing reading of the identification number (label) from the integrated circuit by intruders and checking working capacity of the device for protecting integrated circuits from piracy and falsification.

1 dwg

 

The invention relates to microelectronic semiconductor devices, namely, devices to protect against counterfeiting and tampering of integrated circuits (IC), which are embedded in the chip.

A device of protection against counterfeiting, including a built-in genuine crystal integrated circuit logic and register elements of the input identification number (label) is a trusted manufacturer of integrated circuits used for authenticity control of semiconductor devices, in particular, to determine (identify) the infringing IP (see U.S. patent No. 8090952 from 03 January 2012). The technical solution consists in that in the detecting part of the semiconductor device generates a label (label) with a continuously repeating pattern and sticker (sticker) on top of it. The position of the sticker is converted to a number that is encrypted using the confidential key, forming the signature, i.e. the identification number (label) of the semiconductor device is stored in the figure are individual for the semiconductor device, in explicit form and in encrypted form (in the signature) in the logical register. The semiconductor device user is considered authentic if the signature and position of the stickers installed their compliance.

The disadvantage of this technical solution, chrome� technical complexity of manufacturing a semiconductor device (for example, the need for additional individual photomask and process steps for creating stickers), is the ability for an attacker, producing counterfeit (falsified) semiconductor devices, in particular IP, block diagram comparison of authenticity in the production of counterfeit or adulterated products. Comparison circuit in this case will always return a message indicating that the semiconductor device is genuine. In addition, require special technological equipment for dicarbocyanine IP, and also physical instruments to measure the position of the stickers, which, as a rule, users may not have semiconductor devices interested in checking on their authenticity.

A device of protection against counterfeiting and tampering of integrated circuits, including a built-in genuine crystal integrated circuit is the first logical register with the input member identification number (label) is a trusted manufacturer of integrated circuits working or supporting the findings of the integrated circuit and blocking subsequent enter other ID numbers (see U.S. patent US 7656184 B2 dated February 2, 2010). Built-in protected from counterfeit IC device includes a logical registers to which the manufacturer or trusted�th person is entered identification number (label), presented in clear or encrypted form. This provides a prohibition on further label changes, in particular, not the Trustee. Information from the tag can be read by one of the workers (necessary for the functioning of this IP), or conclusions. This device is not connected and does not interact with the working scheme of IP and does not affect its normal functioning. If the label at some check on the authenticity of IP is different from the original, then this IP is considered to be non-genuine (counterfeit, adulterated).

The disadvantage of this technical solution closest to the proposed is the ability for an attacker, producing counterfeit (falsified) IP, take a tag with a genuine IP and use that tag in the manufacture of counterfeit ICS, thereby making the authentication of IP on the label impossible.

The invention solves the task to prevent unauthorized reading of the identification number with the real IP of the attacker, producing counterfeit or falsified IP, putting them authentic ID number for a counterfeit or falsified IP.

To achieve this technical result in the device of protection against counterfeiting and falsification integral �hem, contains built-in crystal genuine integrated circuit of the first logical register with the input member identification number (label) is a trusted manufacturer of integrated circuits working or supporting the findings of the integrated circuit and blocking subsequent entry of a different identification number, further comprise a second logical register in which the user of the IC enters, for example when testing this IP (for example, on a standard tester), known to him the secret identification number (or more identification numbers, each of which enables normal functioning in one of several desired by the user of the algorithms is) and the logic of coincidence, comparing stored in the IP identification number with the identification number entered by the user, and (by coincidence identification numbers) allowing the normal operation of the IC without the necessity of withdrawing the reference numbers in the working or subsidiary findings of IP to check the authenticity of IP.

Each IP in the manufacture of assigned outdoor identification number I01that uniquely identifies the type of this IP, batch number and other required data (e.g., date of manufacture), in which a binary code is written in the form of a secret number I0 . This identification number is encoded in the form of I01is recorded (e.g., during testing) in the register (permanent storage elements) IP and cannot be modified by an attacker without compromising the integrity of the IP. For example, computing an irreversible function of the discrete exponentiation I01I0(mod p), where I0is an integer from 1 to R-1, R is an integer sufficiently large number, α (1<α<R) and R - unclassified binary number, so, knowing I01computing is hard to define I0. The user of IP, due to the developer or manufacturer of IP, the number of I0calculates the number of I01and enter it in the IP, where it is checked against recorded in the register of the IP numbers of I01. Test enter a different label does not change the state of IP, and their coincidence confirms the identity of the IP and it unlocks the IC for normal operation. Personal secret key for each IP or party IP is entered by a manufacturer of IP that you can trust, for example, when testing. Input validation the user enters a random sequence of random numbers, among which there must be I0. Node check in is the output of IP signal authentication only on the number of I0. After which the entrance test is constantly blocked and IP can operate continuously, as usual (n�long) IP.

The features that distinguish the proposed device from the closest to it is known in U.S. patent No. 7656184 B2 (prior art), is characterized by the presence in the composition of the protection device of counterfeit or falsified IP additional second logical register to the input member by a user of the integrated circuit known identification number, provides input and storage of this identification number when checking for authenticity, and additional logic to match with elements display information about authentication and authorization of normal functioning, allowing for comparison stored in the first logical register of the integrated circuit identification number with the identification number of the second logical register and the coincidence of the identification numbers to allow normal operation of the integrated circuit.

The drawing shows a block diagram of the device for protection against counterfeit and pacificasia IP consisting of a logical register storage tags (performing the role of one-time programmable read only memory) with elements label input, the second logical register to the input elements of the verification marks (performing the role of reprogrammable memory), the comparator circuit (coincidence) label, recorded in logics�their registers with elements o the identity of the IP and with elements permit the normal functioning of IP.

The device operates as follows.

Each IP in the manufacture of assigned outdoor identification number (label) I01that uniquely identifies the type of this IP, batch number and other required data (e.g., date of manufacture), in which a binary code is written in the form of a secret (confidential) number of I0. This identification number is encoded in the form of I01is recorded (for example, in the production and testing of IP trusted manufacturer or Trustee) in the logical register (permanent storage elements) IP and cannot be subsequently modified by an attacker without compromising the integrity of the IP. For example, computing an irreversible function of the discrete exponentiation I01I0(mod p), where I0is an integer from 1 to R-1, R is an integer sufficiently large number, α (1<α<R) and R - unclassified binary number, so, knowing I01computing is hard to define I0. The user of IP, due to the developer or manufacturer of IP secret number I0calculates the number of I01and enter it in the IP, where it is checked against written into the logical register IP number (label) I01. Test enter a different label does not change the state of IP, and their ppsr�Barcelona confirms the identity of the IP and it unlocks the IC for normal operation. Individual label for each IP (or party IP) is introduced by a manufacturer of IP that you can trust, for example, when testing it, using elements label input, see the drawing, either directly to the first logical register (logical register storing the label). When checking the IP on the authenticity of the user via the input elements of the verification tag is inserted into the second logical register (logical register of verification marks) a random sequence of random numbers (labels), among which should be I01. Mark in both the logical registers are fed to the comparison circuit. For labels, non genuine I01the comparison circuit indicates a mismatch, the signal of which is issued, if necessary, to the output of IP elements o authentication of IP. For the number of I01the output of IP, if necessary, the signal authentication of IP, and through the elements of work permit IP signal, allowing normal operation (functioning) of the working scheme of IP, which is remembered (so that IP is then able to function normally without re-inspections). Once validated, the IP output of the comparator circuit is constantly blocked and IP can operate as a normal IP. The correct functioning of the device of protection against counterfeiting and falsification of IP is confirmed in the result of p�of overki of authenticity when the input random check marks do not coincide with authentic label, recorded in logical storage register marks.

In the simplest case, unlike the prototype, the output signal of authenticity working on or supporting the findings of the integrated circuit, with which they can be read by an attacker, there is no need to make sure that the IP is functioning normally with the introduction of a genuine test of the label. Circuit and topological realization of the device is decided on the basis of known engineering solutions.

The proposed device for the protection against counterfeiting and falsification of IP provides:

authentication of IP (i.e. the IP is either genuine or counterfeit or falsified),

- eliminates read by an attacker with IP identification numbers (labels),

- functional test of the device of protection against counterfeiting and falsification of IP.

The device of protection against counterfeiting and tampering of integrated circuits, including a built-in genuine crystal integrated circuit is the first logical register with the input member identification number (label) is a trusted manufacturer of integrated circuits working or supporting the findings of the integrated circuit and blocking subsequent entry of a different identification number, distinct from�occurring, that it additionally introduced the second logical register with elements input by a user of the integrated circuit known identification numbers and the logic of coincidence with elements display information about authentication and authorization of normal functioning, which compares data stored in the first logical register of the integrated circuit identification number with the identification number of the second logical register and the coincidence of the identification numbers allow normal operation of the integrated circuit.



 

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